Monthly Archives: October 2015

Eligibility for sporting competitions caught in the cross-hairs of competition law

In a recent announcement, the European Commission got its skates on and launched an investigation into the rules of the International Skating Union (ISU) which preclude skaters from taking part in events which have not been approved by the ISU. The announcement is only preliminary and does not represent a statement of what may or may not infringe competition law. However, it provides an indicator as to the issues of interest to the Commission, which may potentially have wider implications for other sporting bodies and the impact of competition law on their rules. It also reflects a growing willingness for EU bodies to apply antitrust rules to organisational rules of sporting bodies.

In this case, two Dutch ice speed skaters, Mark Tuitert and Niels Kerstholt, complained to the Commission that the ISU’s rules are “unduly preventing athletes from exercising their profession” by effectively precluding other companies or entities from organising alternative ice-skating events. No more detail has been provided at this stage, however the allegation bears a striking resemblance to that in the Bruce Baker dispute (see my previous post on this here) or the Indian dispute over the BCCI’s licensing of rival cricket events, Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India (see my post here).

Article 1(1) of the ISU’s Constitution (2014) makes clear that it is “the exclusive international sport federation (IF) recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) administering Figure Skating and Speed Skating Sports throughout the world”. Article 2(1) goes on to provide that “[t]he ISU has jurisdiction throughout the world over all forms of international Figure and Speed Skating on ice and on synthetic polymeric ice surfaces whether performed using ice skating blades or substitutes simulating such blades”. Article 7(1)(b) contains a general prohibition that:

Members of the ISU, their affiliated clubs, their individual members and/or all other persons claiming standing as participants in the international activities of a Member or of the ISU […] shall not participate in any activities, national or international, against the integrity, the exclusive role and interests of the ISU.”

This set-up is not unusual. Indeed, in the so-called ‘European model of sport’, as recognised by the Commission itself, one of the ‘specificities of sport’ is that of:

the sport structure, including […] a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to elite level and organised solidarity mechanisms between the different levels and operators, the organisation of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per sport” (White Paper On Sport, COM(2007) 391 final, §4.1)

Although in its more recent documentation (e.g. the Communication, “Developing the European Dimension in Sport” COM(2011) 12 final) the Commission noted that there is no single model of good governance in sport (see §4.1), the ‘specificity of sport’ is now recognised in the EU Treaties, in particular at Article 165(1) TFEU.

However, since its seminal decision in Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-06991 (ECLI:EU:C:2006:492), the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has made clear that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down”. In other words, sporting rules are not per se excluded from the scope of competition law where they have economic effects on the internal market. Indeed, other international bodies, such as FIFA, have been found to be dominant undertakings or associations of undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law (see, e.g. Case T-193/02 Piau v Commission of the European Communities [2005] E.C.R. II-209 (ECLI:EU:T:2005:22) at [114]-[115]).

On eligibility, the ISU Regulations provide (at Article 102(1)(b)) that an “eligible person”, i.e. one who can participate in ISU events (pursuant to Article 103), must be one who

elects to take part only in International Competitions which are:

1. sanctioned by the Member and/or the ISU;

2. conducted by ISU recognized and approved Officials, including Referees, Technical Controllers, Technical Specialists, Judges, Starters, Competitors Stewards and others; and conducted under ISU Regulations.

By virtue of Article 102(2), a person who fails to do so, and participates in other non-sanctioned events may be declared ineligible and effectively excluded from ISU activities.

The Commission has indicated the initial view that this “may prevent alternative event organisers from entering the market or drive them out of business” and therefore “constitute anti-competitive agreements and/or an abuse of a dominant market position in breach of EU antitrust rules”. It should be stressed that this is only an early announcement and the relevant rules will need to be examined according the objectives they pursue, and their proportionality in light of those objectives. However, the substantive analysis of the compatibility of sporting rules with EU competition law appears to be a growing trend.

In MOTOE (Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-4863 (ECLI:EU:C:2008:376)), the CJEU was faced with a case concerning an application by an independent Greek motorcycling association to organise various events, refused by the body charged by Greek law with authorising motorcycling events within the national territory. The CJEU carried out a substantive analysis of the legislative framework and held that “[a] system of undistorted competition, such as that provided for by the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators” (at [51]).

What is more, this is not the first time the ISU has been in the news in the past year, its rules on arbitration famously giving rise to the Munich Higher Regional Court’s decision in the case of Claudia Pechstein v ISU that a decision by the Court of Arbitration for Sport is void (as noted by Jane Mulcahy in her post). In that decision, the German Court considered that for the purposes of German law, the ISU was dominant on the relevant market, namely the organisation of World Speed Skating Championships, as it was the sole person able to organise those events.

These decisions appear to illustrate an incoming tide of interest from national and European competition authorities in the duties of international and national sporting bodies which are in monopolistic positions. It may be that the recognition of the organisational traditions of sport no longer cuts ice (or at least carries the same weight) with competition bodies as it did, such that rules conferring exclusivity and monopolies will need to be justified on the merits. However, this expansive approach is likely to be limited to cases of clear exclusions from or foreclosure of a market, given the Commission’s consistent recognition that the primary responsibility for governance of sports lies with “sport organisations” themselves (see, e.g. §4.2 of the 2012 Communication). Like skaters in the “Kiss and Cry”, awaiting results alongside the rink, this is a space to keep watching…

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Blown out of the water? Air Cargo and the future of extra-EU/EEA cartel damages claims

If the captain of a trading ship fires cannon on a canoe to prevent the canoeists trading with another boat vying for their trade, that boat’s owners can sue the captain: Tarleton v M’Gawley (1793) Peake 270. An intention to gain where your gain must be another’s loss is an intention to injure the other for the purposes of the “unlawful means” economic torts: OBG v Allen [2007] UKHL 21, [63] per Lord Hoffmann, [164]-[167] per Lord Nicholls.

What if there are two other boats competing for the canoe’s business, and the captain doesn’t care which of them will lose out? In such a case there remains an intention to injure, even though one of the victims will in fact have suffered no loss, because ‘there is the intent to damage the identifiable and known class of two boats’, competition for the canoe’s business being ‘effectively a zero-sum game’. So the Court of Appeal accepted in its judgment yesterday [2015] EWCA Civ 1024 in the Air Cargo litigation at [168]-[169].

But swap cannon for cartels; increase the number of victims; change boats for air cargo shippers and freight forwarders; exeunt the canoeists and enter The Gondoliers. In W.H. Newson [2013] EWCA Civ 1377 (blogged here by Andrew Scott), Arden LJ waxed lyrically dismissive of a cartel victim’s argument that it formed part of a class of persons against whom the cartelists intended to injure: ‘When everybody is somebody, then nobody is anybody’, to quote, as she did, Gilbert & Sullivan. Now in Air Cargo the Court of Appeal has endorsed Arden LJ’s approach and affirmed the binding nature of the Newson decision. Because the immediate victims of a cartel, or those next in the supply chain, may be able to pass on their losses to others further down the chain, the cartelists cannot be said to be seeking to gain at their expense. And while the loss must ultimately be borne by someone, to expand the class of victims ‘to anyone in the chain down to the ultimate consumers’ would open up ‘an unknown and unknowable range of potential claimants’. See the Court of Appeal’s judgment at [169]. The Court on this basis (reversing a judgment of Peter Smith J discussed in a previous blog of mine) struck out the Air Cargo claimants’ economic tort claims.

This is significant. Tort claims at common law might allow cartel victims to recover damages in respect of losses which EU/EEA law claim provides no remedy, for example where particular anti-competitive behaviour falls outside the territorial scope of EU/EEA law (see the Court’s judgment at [120]).  But the Court of Appeal at [174] made no secret of their pleasure, as a matter of policy, not to let the common law expand the scope of the remedies available to cartel victims under the law of the EU/EEA.

How then will claimants seek to recover such losses? There may be other routes to (some) recovery, such as the Air Cargo claimants’ “umbrella effect” argument, or claims based upon the competition law of foreign states which can be advanced in this jurisdiction (mentioned in the Court’s judgment at [157] and [120]). But the question of intention to injure in cartel claims must now be ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court. In particular, as Andrew Scott has remarked of Newson, pass-on appears to be attributed an unusual significance in this context. The captain of the Othello could not know whether the owners of the Tarleton would pass on their losses to others further down the chain, but he was liable nonetheless.

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Appealing energy price controls: guidance for beginners from the CMA

The CMA recently published its final determinations in two appeals brought by British Gas and Northern Powergrid against Ofgem’s electricity price controls for the next 8 years (decisions here and here). The appeals were the first under section 11C of the Electricity Act 1989 and the CMA’s decisions will therefore be the first port of call for any practitioners considering appeals against not only price controls but also any modifications made by Ofgem to electricity distributors’ licences. Continue reading

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PRIVATE ACTIONS: The CRA 2015 giveth; and the 2015 CAT Rules taketh away

Introduction

Today, on the 1st October 2015, when we are supposed to be celebrating the brave new world of the Competition Act 1998 (“CA”) as amended by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“CRA”), cartelists and other competition law infringers up and down the land[1] must be rubbing their hands in glee at the transitional provisions contained in Rule 119 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (“the 2015 CAT Rules” or the “New Rules”).[2]

The glee stems from the fact that these transitional provisions are very broad in temporal and material scope and yet very narrow in terms of gateway they provide into the new promised lands of flexible standalone claims,[3] and of collective redress leading to effective enforcement of private damages claims.   The problem, in essence is this: these transitional rules set in aspic for an unnecessarily long time the old CAT regime and all its manifest defects, defects which were the express cause for reform in the first place. Continue reading

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